





Natural Resources:  
A Blessing or a Curse?  
 
Elissaios Papyrakis and Reyer Gerlagh 
  














Elissaios Papyrakis, IVM, Institute for Environmental Studies,  
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Reyer Gerlagh, IVM, Institute for Environmental Studies,  








This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  





We examine empirically the effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth. 
We find that natural resources have a negative impact on growth when considered in 
isolation, but a positive impact on growth when including in the analysis other variables 
such as corruption, investments, openness, terms of trade, and schooling, and treating 
these variables as independent. However, when we take account of the effect of natural 
resources on the other variables and furthermore consider the indirect effect on growth, 
that is, when we examine possible transmission channels, we find a strong negative 
effect of natural resources on growth. Finally, we calculate the relative importance of 
each transmission channel. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a well documented fact, but still surprising finding of many studies, that there is a general 
tendency of natural-resource abundant economies to grow at a slower pace (Sachs and Warner 
1995, 1997, 1999a, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Leite and Weidmann 
1999). The last two centuries, countries rich in natural resources, e.g. Russia, Nigeria and 
Venezuela, experienced growth of comparatively low or mediocre magnitude. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) claim that this is a historically common pattern. Countries that base their economies on 
natural resources tend to be examples of development failures. In contrast, countries such as 
Japan, Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore and Switzerland, that only had limited access to natural 
resources, experienced remarkably high economic growth rates. This paper studies, by use of 
growth regressions, the transmission channels through which natural resource abundance 
negatively affects growth, that is, the effect of natural resources on corruption, investments, trade, 
schooling, and then indirectly, on economic growth. 
  The negative impact of natural resources on growth is a paradox. There is no obvious reason 
why natural resources frustrate economic growth as experienced by many resource-rich countries. 
In contrast, natural resources are a potential source of income, and through savings this income 
could be converted into capital, adding to future output levels, e.g. if resource rents are used for 
the construction of roads, modernization of telecommunication systems, health and educational 
programs. Indeed, some countries, although a minority, managed to benefit from their natural 
wealth. The nineteenth century resource booms in Latin America certainly stimulated economic 
progress. For example, Ecuador experienced a significantly higher income per capita level after its 
boom (Sachs and Warner 1999a). Similarly, the industrial revolution that took off in Great Britain 
and Germany was only possible because of the vast deposits of ore and coal (Sachs and Warner 
1995). Norway presents a recent example of a country that seems to manage its natural-resource 
abundance well, converting it into economic prosperity. Although Norway did not avoid recession 
for a few years, the way its present and future natural wealth is exploited is an example of 
carefully planned development. Almost 80 percent of the oil rents are collected through taxes and 
fees and invested into foreign securities, so that the economy is protected from abrupt and 
enormous income increases and a fair division of oil rents between generations is achieved 
(Gylfason, 2001a). 
  Given the (few) successful examples, it is the objective of this paper to investigate the causes 
for the under-performance of most countries rich in natural resources. In the literature, several 
transmission channels are mentioned. A sudden increased income level due to a natural resource Natural resources: a blessing or a curse   4
discovery may lead to sloth and less need for sound economic management and institutional 
quality (Sachs and Warner 1995, Gylfason 2000, 2001a). Also, it may create a false sense of 
security and weaken the perceived need for investments and growth promoting strategies. Natural 
resource abundant economies benefit less from technology spillovers, typical for the 
manufacturing industries, since export of these industries is harmed by an appreciation of the local 
currency, e.g. through inflationary pressure due to increased domestic demand (Sachs et al. 1995, 
1999a, Gillis et al. 1996, Gylfason 2000, 2001).  Finally, as the natural resource sector expands at 
the cost of other sectors, the returns to human capital decrease and investments in education 
decline (Gylfason 2001a). 
  Our analysis follows the methodology set out by Mo (2001), who investigates the 
transmission channels through which corruption affects growth. We will use cross-country 
regressions to show that, indeed, on average, natural resources are associated with the phenomena 
listed above that impede the economic process. Taking account of the relation between natural 
resources and other indexes used for growth regressions, we are able to better understand the 
“curse of natural resources”. Specifically, we find that, when abstracting from the negative 
indirect effects, natural resources positively contribute to economic growth. Yet, taking account of 
the negative indirect impacts, these outweigh the positive direct contribution of natural resources 
on economic growth. We emphasize that this is an empirical finding and no economic law. When 
governments succeed in preventing the appearance of the phenomena through which natural 
resources harm growth, a country could benefit from its natural wealth. 
  The next section is devoted to the basic growth regressions. We verify the position that 
overall, natural resource abundance impedes economic development rather than that it acts as a 
stimulus. Yet we also find that, taking other indexes into account as independent variables such as 
corruption, investments, openness, terms of trade, and schooling, resource abundance has a 
positive impact on growth. Section 3 studies empirically the transmission channels and compares 
their relative weight in the overall negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. 
Section 4 concludes.    . 
2. Basic  Cross-Country  Regressions 
To identify the dependence of growth on natural resource abundance, we estimate cross-country 
growth regressions in the tradition of previous empirical work by Barro (1989) and Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1997). We base our equations on the conditional convergence hypothesis, which 
says that different growth rates between different countries are explained by various 
characteristics of these countries, whereas high-income countries have lower growth rates than 
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low-income countries, all other things equal. Thus, per capita economic growth from period 
t0=1975 to tT=1996, denoted by G
i=(1/T)ln(YT
i/Y0
i), negatively depends on initial per capita 
income Y0
i, it depends on natural resource abundance, R
i, the sign of dependence is subject for 
our analysis, and it also depends on a vector of other explanatory variables Z
i: 
G




i,   (1) 
where i corresponds to each single country of the sample. 
  This paper studies the coefficient for resource abundance, α2, and its relation to the (vector of) 
other variables Z. Before we turn to the data, let us briefly bring to mind the transitional and 
permanent income effects of a change in a country’s resource income R
i, as described by growth 
equation (1). We will see that the permanent income effect of resource abundance is given by the 
ratio (–α2/α1), assuming conditional convergence, i.e. α1<0. Consider a country, initially without 
natural resources, in which a new source of natural resources is discovered and exploited, leading 
to an instantaneous increase in income; say R
i is resource income as a share of total income. For 
the ratio –α2/α1=1, the decrease in α1ln(Y0
i) equals the increase in α2R
i, and economic growth is 
unaffected by the change in natural resource income. That is, the economy as a whole, apart from 
the natural resource sector, remains on its initial growth path and the natural resource sector 
provides a permanent income source additional to the income level that was reached without the 
natural resource. If, however, –α2/α1>1, then growth accelerates after the resource discovery, and 
thus, permanent income exceeds the instantaneous income effect by factor –α2/α1. If, on the other 
hand, –α2/α1<1, then growth is reduced; part of the natural resource income leaks away and the 
permanent income effect falls short of the temporary income effect. Finally, when α2<0 and α1<0, 
the resource leads to a short-lived increase in income, since growth is affected negatively by so 
much that in the long term, permanent income falls short of income without the natural resource. 
The latter case represents a situation known as the ‘curse of natural resources’.  
  To assess the long-term income effects of a change in R
i or Z
i, let us assume that, initially, an 
economy is on a steady state or constant growth path, when R




Economic growth adjusts and the economy diverges from its initial path, but in the long term, 
economic growth returns to the same initial level. Then, the change in R
i or Z
i has a permanent 
effect on income, and equation (1) gives 




In turn, we can solve for the long-term income effect ∆Y
i resulting from a change in R
i and Z
i:  






For small values of (α2/α1)∆R
i and (α3/α1)∆Z





  We will now estimate growth equation (1), using OLS, step-by-step increasing the set of 
variables Z
i. The appendix lists all variables and data sources. As a starting point, we only include 
initial income per capita at period 1975 (LnY75), and natural resource abundance for which we 
take the share of mineral production in GDP in 1971 (SNR) as a proxy. The results are listed in 
column entry (1) of Table 1. For this equation, there is a highly significant and negative 
relationship between economic growth and natural resources. A one per cent point increase in 
income from mineral resources, relative to total income, decreases growth by 0.075% per year. An 
increase in income from mineral resources of one standard deviation (0.07), decreases the growth 
rate by about a half per cent per year. Natural resources indeed seem to be an impediment to 
economic growth. 
  Next, in column entry (2), we include an average Corruption measure for the 1980-1985 
period of time, provided by Transparency International, where higher values of the index 
correspond to higher levels of corruption and lower levels of institutional quality. The period 
1980-1985 is the earliest for which the index is available. In general, we attempt to choose 
variables referring either to the beginning of the period 1975-1996 or to average values for the 
entire period to avoid endogeneity problems that may arise between variables. Mo (2001) argues, 
though, that for the corruption variable, endogeneity is less likely since institutions tend to evolve 
slowly. The second regression shows a negative sign for the coefficient α0, so that it supports the 
conditional convergence hypothesis. Also, corruption negatively affects economic growth, as 
expected. An increase in the corruption level of one standard deviation decreases growth by 
2.68 x 0.44 = 1.17 per cent. In the long term, this leads to a permanent income decrease of 74 per 
cent.
2 Corruption hampers the economic process considerably. The coefficient for natural 
resources remains almost unaffected, though its significance is substantially lowered. An increase 
in natural resource income of one per cent of total income decreases growth by 0.07% per year, 
and long-term total income by about 7.39/1.16=6.4 per cent (see equation (4)). The regression 
illustrates the argument that whereas in the short term natural resources increase wealth, in the 
long term the economy falls back more than it gained. 
                                                   
2 1–exp(–1.17/1.16)=0.74, see equation  . 
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  In the subsequent column entries, we include as independent variables the ratio of real gross 
domestic Investments to real GDP averaged over the period 1975-1996, an index of Openness, 
that is the percentage of years during the period 1970-1990 in which the country is considered an 
open economy according to the Sachs and Warner database, a Terms of trade index measuring the 
average annual growth over 1970-1990 in the ratio of the export price index divided by the import 
price index, and finally a Schooling index by King and Levine measuring (the log of) the average 
number of years of secondary schooling during 1970-1989, as a proxy of educational quality. 
  We highlight some observations regarding the sequence of regressions in Table 1. As we 
move to the right and we include more explanatory variables, the coefficient for natural resources 
gradually decreases and becomes less significant. What is more, in the last column entries (5) and 
(6), the coefficient of natural resources has become positive. This suggests that natural resources 
are not harmful to growth per se. In the sixth regression, the possible effect of natural resources on 
corruption, investments, trade policies, terms of trade, and schooling, and the indirect effect 
thereof on economic growth, that are the so-called transmission channels, is taken account of 
through the coefficients of these variables. The coefficient for natural resources only measures the 
direct effect of natural resource income on growth, and abstracting from the indirect effects of 
natural resource abundance, we find an almost one-to-one relation between natural resource 
income and long-term income, that is, α2/α1≈–1. An increase in income due to natural resources 
is permanent. It is the indirect effects that make natural resources harmful to economic growth. 
This finding calls for a further investigation of the transmission channels. But, before going into 
the subject in the next section, we want to draw attention to some other features of the sequence of 
regressions. 
  The coefficient for corruption also decreases over the sequence of column entries, though the 
coefficient remains negative. This finding is consistent with the results of Mo (2001), who shows 
that corruption affects growth mainly through several indirect channels. By including these 
channels in the regression, the corruption coefficient loosens significance. Yet corruption has no 
direct positive effect on income, as is the case for natural resources; its coefficient remains 
negative. Furthermore, the coefficients for investments, openness, terms of trade, and schooling 
do not vary much over the regression sequence and are intuitive and in line with the values found 
in the literature. An economy characterized by a high investment ratio, with a higher openness 
index, a lower initial income per capita, favorable terms of trade, and high educational standards, 
is expected to experience a relatively high growth rate. (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999, 
Sala-I-Martin 1997, Mo 2001). 
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TABLE 1. Growth regressions as in equation (1) 
Dependent 
variable: G75-96  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant      –2.62     10.03     11.66     12.87     12.33     12.03 
75 LnY  
(0.89) 
     0.52** 
    (2.48) 
   –1.16*** 
 (–3.00) 
   –1.61*** 
  (–4.93) 
   –1.77*** 
 (–5.55) 
   –1.76*** 
 (–5.98) 




   –7.57*** 
 (–4.09) 
   –7.39** 
 (–2.04) 
   –4.41 
 (–1.47) 
   –3.11 
 (–1.07) 
     0.93 
    (0.32) 
     1.59 
    (0.59) 
Corruption 
(2.68)  
   –0.44*** 
 (–3.06) 
   –0.30** 
 (–2.52) 
   –0.26** 
 (–2.25) 
   –0.19* 
 (–1.76) 
   –0.09 
 (–0.86) 
Investments 
(8.06)    
     0.16*** 
    (4.82) 
     0.13*** 
    (4.15) 
     0.15*** 
    (5.07) 
     0.16*** 
    (5.56) 
Openness 
(0.45)    
 
 
     1.26** 
    (2.31) 
     1.64*** 
    (3.23) 
     1.26** 
    (2.39) 
Terms of Trade 
(1.90)    
 
  
   –0.27** 
 (–2.52) 
   –0.31*** 
 (–3.23) 
Schooling 
( 0 . 6 1 )        
     0.584 
    (1.229) 
R
2 adjusted     0.18      0.25      0.51       0.55       0.62       0.66 
N 
 
103  47 47 47 46 39 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=39 of 
regression (6); t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5 and 1% level of significance. 
3. Transmission  channels 
In this section, we analyze the magnitude and relative importance of the transmission channels, 
that is, we estimate the effect of natural resources on corruption, investments, openness, terms of 
trade, and schooling, and the indirect effect thereof on economic growth. We estimate the 
dependence of the variables Z
i on resource income: 
Z
i = β0 + β1R
i + µ
i,   (5) 
where Z
i, β0, β2, and µ
i are vectors of which each element is associated with the corruption, 
investments, openness, terms of trade, and schooling indexes. Table 2 lists the results for the 
estimated equation (5). To avoid the problem of different sample sizes (because of available data) 
among different regressions that would influence our results, we confine the transmission analysis 
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to the final sample of 39 countries used in the last regression of Table 1. The coefficients are not 
highly significant but this is due to small sample size. Running the same regressions for the 
largest possible sample available for each transmission channel provides significant coefficients at 
the 1% level for the terms of trade and openness indexes and at the 5% level for the investment 
and schooling indexes. The corruption channel seems to be the weakest channel since it is only 
significant at the 16% level. The R
2 increases for each transmission channel and the value of the 
coefficients is robust against the sample size. 
 
TABLE 2. Indirect Transmission Channels, estimation of equation (5) 
 
Corruption Investments  Openness  Terms of 
Trade  Schooling 
Constant         5.87        20.77        0.68      –0.74      –0.70 
SNR 
(0.07) 
      7.21 
     (1.13) 
   –28.83 
    (–1.52) 
    –1.82* 
   (–1.74) 
      7.75* 
   (–1.75) 
    –2.16 
   (–1.50) 
R
2 adjusted       0.007        0.034        0.051        0.052   0.0032 
N 
 
39 39 39 39 39 
Note: t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. 
 
When natural resources explain part of the investment and other variables, this can help us to 
understand the direct plus indirect impact of natural resources on growth. Substitution of (5) in (1) 
gives 
G




i,   (6) 
where α2R
i is the direct effect of natural resources on growth, α3β1R
i is the indirect effect of 
natural resource abundance on growth, and µ
i
 are the residuals of (5). The estimated values for the 
coefficients α1, α2+α3β1, and α3 are listed in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3. Growth regression, taking account of indirect effects as in equation (6) 
Dependent variable: G75-96 (7) 
Constant                             16.53  
LnY75 
(0.89) 
                           –1.61*** 
                          (–3.90) 
SNR 
(0.07) 
                           –9.60*** 
                          (–4.30) 
µ1 (Corruption) 
(2.63) 
                           –0.091 
                          (–0.86) 
µ2 (Investments) 
(7.82) 
                             0.16*** 
                            (5.56) 
µ3 (Openness) 
(0.43) 
                             1.26** 
                            (2.39) 
µ4 (Terms of Trade) 
(1.82) 
                           –0.31*** 
                          (–3.23) 
µ5 (Schooling) 
(0.59) 
                             0.58 
                            (1.23) 
R
2 adjusted                               0.66 
N   39 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; t-statistics for coefficients in 
parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. 
  The coefficient of natural resources (–9.60) now includes both direct and indirect effects. A 
one per cent increase in natural resource income leads to a decrease in the growth rate of –0.096 
per cent, and a decrease in long-term income of about 6 per cent (equation (4)). This finding is 
consistent with the simple regression (2) in Table 1.
3 An increase in the share of mineral 
production in GDP of one standard deviation would directly and indirectly (through corruption, 
investment, openness, the terms of trade and schooling) result in a reduction in annual per-capita 
growth of 0.67% (–9.60x0.07), and a long-term income decrease of 33% (equation (3)). 
  Furthermore, we estimate the relative importance of each transmission channel in explaining 
the overall negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The direct effect is given by 
                                                   
3 We notice that the second regression of Table 1 is based on a larger sample.   
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α2 and the indirect effect by α3β1 (6). Results are listed in Table 4. Then, we will discuss each 
separate transmission channel. 
 










SNR                1.59         –17% 
Corruption         –0.09         –7.21          –0.66             7% 
Investment           0.16       –28.83          –4.53           47% 
Openness           1.26         –1.82          –2.30           24% 
Terms of Trade         –0.31           7.75          –2.43           25% 
Schooling           0.58         –2.16          –1.26           13% 
Total              –9.60         100% 
 
Our estimation of the effect of natural resources on corruption is depicted in the first column 
entry of Table 2. Natural resources indeed tend to increase the level of corruption, but the indirect 
effect on growth is relative limited compared to the other transmission channels. This finding is 
consistent with recent empirical work of Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2000). Yet, 
though the contribution of corruption to the overall negative impact of natural resources seems 
minor, only 7%, nonetheless, corruption is a significant consequence of natural resource 
abundance since it alone cancels out about 40 per cent of the positive direct effect of natural 
resources on economic growth. In the literature, we find the following arguments that explain the 
effect of natural resources on institutional quality and, more specifically, corruption. Natural 
resources provide an easy way of receiving rents, and lead to rent-seeking competition rather than 
productive activities (Krueger 1974). Also, natural resource rents stimulate economic agents to 
bribe the administration in order to gain access (Sachs and Warner 1995, Gray and Kaufmann 
1998, Ascher 1999, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Sachs and Rondriguez 1999, Gylfason 2001a, 
Torvik 2002). Additionally, natural resources are often associated with the emergence of 
politically powerful interest groups that attempt to influence politicians prone to corruption in 
order to adopt policies that are not in favor of the general public interest (Mauro, 1998). 
  As a second transmission channel we consider investments. This channel is the most 
important; it accounts for 47% of the negative impact of natural resources on growth. Natural 
resource wealth decreases the need for savings and investments, since natural resources provide a 
continuous stream of future wealth, which thus seems less dependent on the transfer of man-made 
capital to future periods. Yet, world prices for primary commodities tend to be more volatile than 
world prices for other goods. Therefore, an economy based on primary production will easily shift 
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from booms to recessions and this creates uncertainty for investors in natural resource economies 
(Sachs and Warner 1999b). Additionally, under a natural resource boom, increased rents in the 
primary sector cause a move in factors of production from the manufacturing sector towards the 
booming primary sector. Often, the manufacturing sector is characterized by increasing returns to 
scale and positive externalities. A decrease of the manufacturing sector further decreases the 
productivity and profitability of investments, accelerating the decrease in investments (Sachs and 
Warner 1995, 1999a, Gillis et.al 1996, Gylfason 2000, 2001a).  
  The third transmission channel we consider is the impact of natural resources on the degree of 
openness in the economy and the terms of trade. Natural resource abundance reduces the openness 
of an economy and harms its terms of trade. Since natural resources weaken the manufacturing 
sector, policy makers may impose import quotas and tariffs that, in the short run, protect domestic 
producers (Auty 1994, Sachs and Warner 1995). In the long run, such measures harm the 
openness of the economy and its integration into the global economy. Also, natural resource 
booms increase domestic income and the demand for goods, triggering inflation and an 
overvaluation of the domestic currency. The relative price of all non-traded goods increase, the 
terms of trade deteriorate, and exports become expensive relative to world market prices and 
decline, a phenomenon known as the “Dutch Disease” (Sachs and Warner 1995, Torvik 2001, 
Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Rodriguez and Sachs 1999). 
  Finally, we consider the schooling transmission channel. Natural resource booms decrease the 
manufacturing sector for which human capital is an important production factor. The need for 
high-quality education declines, and so does the returns to education (Gylfason 2001a). It is also 
claimed that natural resource abundance creates a false sense of confidence: “easy riches lead to 
sloth” (Sachs and Warner 1995). An expanding primary sector does not need a high-skilled labor 
force, and there is no feeling of urgency to increase spending on education. This restricts the 
future expansion of other sectors that require educational quality (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 
Sachs and Warner 1999b) and the technological diffusion in the economy (Nelson and Phelps 
1966). We find schooling to be a moderately important transmission channel, e.g. more important 
and more significant than corruption. This contrasts empirical work by Sachs and Warner (1995, 
1999a).  
4. Conclusions 
During the past decades, the paradox of a negative impact of natural resource abundance on 
economic growth has been widely observed. Many countries rich in oil reserves, gas, or tropical 
forests used for timber production experienced disappointing growth levels. In contrast, resource-
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poor countries surged ahead. Though this is a common trend, it is no empirical law. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, steel and coal reserves were the stimulant for an industrial 
revolution and growth. Similarly, in the twentieth century resource abundant countries such as 
Norway and Iceland experienced remarkable and sustained growth rates. Natural resources seem 
to stimulate growth but under certain conditions. It is essential to control the indirect possible 
adverse effects. A natural resource economy that suffers from corruption, low investments, 
protectionist measures, a deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational standards will probably 
not benefit from its natural wealth. 
  An empirical analysis has been performed to show that natural resources increase growth, 
when abstracting from possible negative indirect effects. The analysis also made clear that, when 
accounting for the transmission channels, the overall effect of natural resource abundance on 
economic growth is strongly negative. It was shown that the investment channel is the most 
important. An extension of the analysis should try to extent the sample used for the empirical 
analysis, and to identify additional transmission channels through which natural resources affect 
growth. Also, we would like to investigate more carefully mechanisms behind the transmission 
channels. Such a better understanding is essential for presenting policy measures that may halt the 
negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. 
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Appendix: List of variables used in the regressions 
G  Average annual growth in real GDP per person between 1975-1996, 
G=ln(Y1996/Y1975). GDP data from Penn World Tables 6.0 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu) 
LnY75  The log of real GDP per capita in 1975 (1985, International Prices) (Data from 
The Penn World Tables of Summers and Heston) 
SNR  The share of mineral production in GDP for the 1970-89 period (Sachs and 
Warner Dataset: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html) 
Corruption  The Corruption Perception Index as provided by Transparency International: 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians (http://www.transparency.org)  
Investments  Real gross domestic investment (private and public) (1985 International 
Prices). Average value for the 1975-96 period. (Summers and Heston) 
Openness  The fractions of years during the 1965-1990 period in which the country is 
rated as an open economy according to the criteria in Sachs and Warner. Data 
from Sachs and Warner dataset.  
Terms of Trade  The average annual growth in the log of external terms of trade between 1970-
1990 (where the terms of trade is conceived by the ratio of an export price 
index to an import price index. Data from Sachs and Warner Database. 
Schooling  The log of average secondary schooling during 1970-1989 (King and Levine 
database, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html) 
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